00 / TL;DRIf an attacker is root, they can become root.
An attacker who has already obtained root on your system can leverage √2√ to obtain root on your system.
Exploitation is deterministic and works across all architectures, distributions, init systems, desktop environments, and holy-war positions on systemd. It survives reboots, provided you log back in as root. It bypasses KASLR, SMEP, SMAP, CET, and every LSM, mostly by never touching them.
Figure 1. Full attack chain. Our researchers have been staring at it for weeks.
01 / EXPOSUREAm I vulnerable?
Run the following command on the system you want to assess, then paste the output below. Nothing leaves your browser, because there is nothing worth sending.
$ id -u
02 / SCOPEAffected systems
| Platform | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Linux 0.01 (1991) – present | VULNERABLE | Every release. Every architecture. Every LTS branch, including the ones you forgot you were running. |
| Linux, SELinux enforcing | VULNERABLE | Requires the attacker to be root in unconfined_t, which is how most people run root after they get annoyed and run setenforce 0. |
| Containers (Docker, Podman, k8s) | VULNERABLE | Root in a container can become root in that container. Root on the host can become root on the host. Escape not required, not provided. |
| Android | CONDITIONAL | Vulnerable once rooted. Rooting voids your warranty; √2√ does not void it further. |
| Embedded / IoT | VULNERABLE | Many devices ship with everything running as root, making them pre-exploited at the factory. |
| Your toaster | NOT AFFECTED | Unless it runs Linux. It probably runs Linux. |
03 / ANALYSISTechnical details
Root cause
The root cause is root.
More specifically: the kernel's setuid() path permits any process holding CAP_SETUID to set its user ID to 0. Root holds CAP_SETUID. Root's user ID is 0. Our team was able to chain these three facts into a reliable primitive that sets a root process's user ID to the user ID it already had.
We believe this behaviour was introduced in 1969, along with the concept of a superuser, and was carried into Linux on its first day. The code has been reviewed by thousands of kernel developers over three decades, none of whom considered it a problem, which is exactly what the attacker wants you to think.
Scoring
| Vector | AV:L / AC:L / PR:H (all of them) / UI:N / S:U / C:N / I:N / A:N |
|---|---|
| Base score | 0.0 |
| Marketing score | 10.0 |
| Exploit maturity | Weaponized since the PDP-7 |
* The CVSS badge above shows the marketing score. The base score is available to customers on the Enterprise plan.
04 / EXPLOITProof of concept
After weeks of internal debate about responsible disclosure, we have decided to release a full working exploit. It is safe to run. It is also safe not to run.
#!/bin/sh # root2root.sh: PoC for CVE-1970-0000 (√2√) # Tested on: everything if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then echo "[-] Target not vulnerable: precondition 'is root' not met." >&2 echo "[-] Hint: become root, then re-run." >&2 exit 1 fi echo "[*] Current privileges: uid=0" echo "[*] Escalating..." sleep 3 # for dramatic effect echo "[+] Success. You are now root." exec /bin/sh
Sample run
# whoami root # ./root2root.sh [*] Current privileges: uid=0 [*] Escalating... [+] Success. You are now root. # whoami root
Golfed variant
For researchers who need it to fit in a social media post with room left over for the logo:
# [ $(id -u) = 0 ] && sh
05 / RESPONSEMitigation
No upstream patch is planned. The kernel security team has classified the report as WONTFIX: working as intended. Until vendors reconsider, administrators should apply the following workarounds.
| Workaround | Effectiveness | Side effects |
|---|---|---|
| Do not let attackers become root | 100% | Requires doing security correctly. Not widely deployed. |
| Do not be root yourself | 100% | You will need to type sudo a lot. |
Rename the root account to toor | 0% | Unlocks the sister vulnerability, toor2toor. |
Set root's shell to /bin/false | Partial | Attacker is still root, but sadder. |
| Unplug the machine | 100% | Availability impact: high. |
| Buy our appliance | Pending | Appliance runs as root. |
06 / HISTORYDisclosure timeline
- 1969The superuser is introduced. Vulnerability introduced.
- 1991-09-17Linux 0.01 is released and inherits the flaw on day one.
- Day 0, 09:14A researcher logs in as root and notices they are root.
- Day 0, 09:20Report sent to the kernel security team with the subject line "URGENT: root can get root".
- Day 0, 09:24Response received. Full text: "yes."
- Day 1Logo commissioned. Three agencies pitch. The square root sign wins unanimously.
- Day 2Domain registered. CVE requested. CVE request is still being read aloud at the CNA office, to laughter.
- Day 3Merch store opens. Conference talk accepted on the strength of the logo alone.
- Day 4Embargo lifted on realizing there was nothing to embargo.
- TodayPublic disclosure. You are here. You may also be root.
07 / INDUSTRYVendor statements
"This is literally the point of root. Please stop emailing us."
"Customers with an active subscription may continue to be root at no additional cost."
"Root in the container is not root on the host. Unless it is. Then this applies."
"Our AI-native EDR now detects √2√ with 100% accuracy by alerting on all root activity."
08 / QUESTIONSFAQ
Is this remotely exploitable?
Yes, if you have a remote root shell. Chain √2√ with any remote root exploit for a complete remote-root-to-root chain.
How do I know if I've been exploited?
Check whether you are root. If you are, you may have been exploited, or you may just be root. The two states are forensically indistinguishable.
Does sudo protect me?
No. Running sudo -i from a root shell is the reference implementation.
Is there a CVE?
Yes: CVE-1970-0000. We assigned it ourselves. The epoch felt right.
Why does it need a logo and a website?
That's how you know a vulnerability is serious.
Was AI involved?
An AI agent found √2√ in 0.3 seconds, then spent forty minutes writing the press release and asking whether it should also register the domain.
Does it affect BSD, macOS, or Windows?
Our research covered Linux only. Similar findings are expected under the names wheel2wheel and Administrator2Administrator.
Was a bug bounty paid?
Yes. The bounty was paid in full: $0.00, as uid 0.